Grief Journal : I Will Always Wonder Who You Would Have Been: Pregnancy, Infant, Baby, and Child Loss ~ 6x9 College Ruled Notebook

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Part of me will always wonder how it’s possible to fake the way you looked at me, how your eyes were the most truthful liars I’ve ever met, how you could look at someone like that and not feel anything. They say your eyes are the window to your soul and I could’ve sworn I’ve seen your soul, I’ve seen your heart, part of me will always wonder how the hell I fell in love with you that night if I hadn’t seen your heart — if I hadn’t felt it. Maybe it would’ve been easier to hate you if I hadn’t seen right through you. The problem of future contingents arises from considering whether they are true or false. Taking future contingents to be true or false raises the specter of fatalism. Consider the following representative argument that derives a fatalist conclusion from premises about whether a future contingent is true or false: MacFarlane, J. (2003). Future contingents and relative truth. The Philosophical Quarterly, 53(212), 321–336. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00315

Part of me will always wonder what would have happened if I hadn’t said too much too soon, if I’d played it cool for a little longer, if I’d controlled my emotions the way you did, if I had just waited a few weeks before telling you how I felt. Maybe I could’ve made you stay. Like I've told you before; I missed you while you were here. I'll miss you when you're gone. I'll miss you when I'm standing with you. But most of all, I miss, us. I can't sit here and name all the things we've done together. You know that it'd take way too long to do. I never sit here and cry about what we used to be. I sit here and laugh about what we could be in the future. You make me laugh even when I'm not talking to you. There is something about you that I just can't get over. The fact that you do look like a girl still gets me every time. I'm just playing with ya, I love you. You know that. We may have questioned it and had some pretty rough times. But we made it through. And in the end, I think you could say we were the best couple we could be. We lasted and didn't break up for stupid reasons. Note how we would model Susan’s initial wondering whether Larry is bald. It involves wondering which of the possible, complete answers: ‘Larry is bald’ is true, ‘Larry is bald’ is middle, ‘Larry is bald’ is false is the correct answer to L. And once Susan learns that ‘Larry is bald’ is middle, her inquiry comes to an end. But this model cannot be applied in the case of wondering about future contingents since, once one accepts Middlism for future contingents, (NA24) is true and (NA24) is false are ruled out as possible answers to N. Just as coming to know that ‘Larry is bald’ is middle makes it inappropriate for Susan to continue to wonder whether L, coming to know that (NA24) is middle seems to make it inappropriate to continue to wonder whether N. Of course it is open to the Middlist to claim that wondering about future contingents is wholly different than wondering about vague propositions, but considering the case of vagueness suggests that wondering whether in cases of indeterminacy is plausibly understood as wondering what truth-value a given proposition has, and learning the truth-value renders further wondering inappropriate. The Middlist who insists that wondering about future contingents is appropriate would need to give this up: knowing what truth-value a proposition, p, has is compatible with wondering whether p. It is worth noting the oddity in accepting this. For a Middlist to wonder whether it will rain tomorrow is not for her to wonder whether it is true that it will rain tomorrow. She knows that it is not true that it will rain tomorrow, yet she wonders whether it will rain. Footnote 33 An utterance of ‘I know that it is not true that it will rain tomorrow and I wonder whether it will’ certainly sounds defective, but should be assertable if knowing what truth-value a future contingent has is compatible with wondering about it. Furthermore, Middlists shouldn’t hesitate to accept a bet that it is not true that it will rain tomorrow (and shouldn’t hesitate to accept a bet that it is not false that it will). One might have thought that introducing an intermediate truth-value provides a way of modelling our ignorance of future contingents, but once we recognize that ignorance and wondering are plausibly understood as ignorance and wondering about what truth-value a proposition has, we realise that introducing an intermediate truth-value undermines, rather than vindicates, our wondering about future contingents. 4.3 Supervaluationism I’ve heard many say that the chances a pregnancy can threaten the life of the mother are so very slim, practically unheard of, but that was me. RELATED: A Mother’s Love Can’t Be Measured In Weeks That’s the part of me that wishes, the part that romanticizes the past, the part that will recreate scenes from a romantic movie with you, the part of me that dreams, the part that sometimes goes against all logic and believes in the impossible, the part that will always believe in mad love.

I Was There to Walk My Mother to Heaven

It wasn’t you, as painfully cliché as it is, it’s true. It wasn’t you, it was never you – it was always me. I’m the one who isn’t ready for love. I’m not the one who wants goodbye kisses or to be strolling through the store holding hands, I’m not the one who wants to depend on someone, I’m not the one who is ready to give up my single life where all I know how to do is take up space. Trying to make room for someone else isn’t on my to-do list this week or anytime soon. The sentence structure I wonder [X] is declarative. The X is usually a noun clause that is the object of the verb wonder.

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What exactly are questions? There is no general agreement on the metaphysics of questions and fortunately, exactly what questions are need not concern us. I will follow Friedman in assuming that questions are not propositions (Friedman, 2013, 150). Some take questions to be sets of propositions, where the set of propositions consists of all the possible answers to the question. Others take questions to be open propositions. Footnote 16 Three days prior to that life-altering decision, I was admitted to the hospital with stroke-level blood pressures that sent everyone into action and panic immediately. My condition was a mystery to the doctors for a few days while I underwent every scan, test, and lab under the sun to figure out why I was so ill. After days of this, my incredible maternal-fetal medicine doctor came to me with her theory, but it took a little more time for everything to unfold because what she told us was so unfathomable, rare, and heartbreaking. I was essentially carrying an undetected twin pregnancy with a complete molar pregnancy alongside our growing Maya.

Part of me will always wonder if it was just me, if it was all my head, if whatever we had was nothing but my imagination or a dream that felt so real. Part of me will always wonder what happened to you, why you turned into someone you’re not, why you brutally rejected someone’s love and why you stopped yourself from falling. Maybe I could’ve been everything you were looking for. Enter guilt, my thoughts in response to these words: "What is wrong with me? Why am I upset when it was early and other women are obviously able to get over it without much fuss. " Like Falsism, Middlism appears to offer a therapy: In accepting the theory, I come to know that (NA24) is middle and so I know the true, complete answer to the question that serves as the content of my wondering. And so, by (WIN1) I ought not wonder. But I do continue to wonder, and my wondering certainly seems appropriate. This raises a problem for Middlism.

Questions have possible answers where answers can be understood as propositions. Footnote 17 So the following are all possible answers to A: a.: Necessarily, if Q is a question pertaining to time t2 and one knows at t1 a true, complete answer-at- t2 to Q, then one ought not wonder at t1 whether Q. Footnote 41 I can assume without contradiction that my presence in Warsaw at a certain moment of next year, e.g. at noon on 21 December, is at the present time determined neither positively or negatively. Hence it is possible, but not necessary, that I shall be present in Warsaw at the given time. On this assumption the proposition I shall be in Warsaw at noon on 21 December of next year can at the present time be neither true nor false. For if it were true now, my future presence in Warsaw would have to be necessary, which is contradictory to the assumption. If it were false now, on the other hand, my future presence in Warsaw would have to be impossible, which is also contradictory to the assumption. Therefore the proposition considered is at the moment neither true nor false ... (Łukasiewicz 1930, 53). According to Friedman ( 2013), wondering is one of several attitudes, like inquiring, investigating, and suspending judgment, that she calls ‘interrogative attitudes’. She argues that such interrogative attitudes have questions as their contents. Consider the sentence ‘Peter wonders whether Nicola will have eggs for breakfast tomorrow’. It is standard to take the interrogative complement ‘whether Nicola will have eggs for breakfast tomorrow’ to have a question as its semantic content. Friedman argues that, similarly, we should take the mental content of interrogative attitudes to be questions. Whereas the content of Moira’s belief that it is raining in Glasgow is a proposition: that it is raining in Glasgow, the content of Aidan’s wondering whether it is raining in Glasgow is not a proposition, but a question: Is it raining in Glasgow?.